The problem of Evil according to Maximus the Confessor

Christina Kapsimalakou, PhD Philosophy, Nea Sion 90-96 (2008- 2014), p. 429-444

Abstract

The subject of the present paper is a confession of faith that evil has no substance (hypostasis) or essence. It is ontologically nonexistent, non- be­ing. This implies that evil constitutes a reality deprived of completeness and gains hypostatical presence as a negatively existent substance. Final­ly, what arises from this essay is the incontestable fact that evil derives from the ex nihilo createdness of beings and from their self-determined motion towards nihilistic distortion.

Keywords: Evil, good, freedom, use, passion.

I. Introduction.

Maximus draws a parallel between the self-determination of God and the self-determination of man, who was created in the image of God (1) . As regards the way in which self-determination must be understood, it is noteworthy that, for Maximus, the ba­sis and the archetype of man's self- determination is the self - determination of God (2) . In exploring this further, we see that Maximus repeatedly states his belief that the human soul is not moved by another, but is self-moving ( αυτοκίνητος ) (3) . Equally important is his remark that in non - rational being's nature is the moving principle, whereas in man's nature is moved by the man himself, who moves according to his will in a self­determining way ( εξουσιαστικώς κατά θέλησιν κινουμένω ) (4) . Freedom is an essential part of the imago Dei, for without it man could not be in any way like God, since he would have to be governed by necessity (5) . In the fallen state of existence which is characterized by the dialectic of good or evil (6) , freedom has come to signify the possibility of choice between two things, and thus it has acquired a rather ethical significance. In this re­spect, L. Thunberg says that freedom belongs to human nature, to the man's character as a being created in the image of God, but man - sometimes - uses it to his own destruction (7) . This classical idea is linked with another conviction of a Platonic tendency: evil is a completely negative phenomenon.

In this paper, we will attempt to present Maximus the Con­fessor's treatment of the problem of evil, which will provide some useful indications for understanding the ontological premises pertaining to it and the metaphysical premises follow­ing it.

II. Human free will

As has already been mentioned, Maximus repeatedly point­ed out that we are endowed with a self-determining human will, a self-determining human power of willing, by virtue of which we are able to will in a self-determining manner. It is we as Willers who manifest our self-determining power of the will­ing in willing for certain things. It is we who decide whether to speak or not, when to speak, what to say at any given moment, and for what purpose (8) . Let us elaborate these points further. When referring to the self-determining motion ( αυτεξούσιος κίνησις ) of beings, in ontological and logical implications, someone must also consider, among other theoretical - and at once pre-theoretical and post-theoretical - searches, the problem of evil, which indeed holds, more or less, central place in any moral issue. Nonetheless, it is interwoven with human actions and with the options that form it according to the circumstanc­es, whether as self-referrals or ad extra views. Philosophical and theological traditions have highlighted this issue as a major determinant of the relationship between man and God. This is indeed a wider array of concerns closely intertwined with psy­chological factors, not always comfortably detectable.

According to Maximus, evil is promoted by the self­determining motion of personal beings. Therefore, personal and rational beings freely promote evil in various and differentiated situations. Thus, despite the undeniable fact that God is the person who grants free will ( αυτεξούσιον ) as an ability and means for man, it is needless to discuss whether any person is directed toward good or evil without his/her free choice and if this is accompanied by all those factors that are associated with its content. It is obvious in this case that the categories of good and evil - moral judgments - are too posterior to what is pres­ently being discussed on the matter of the mystery of freedom. As has already been mentioned, for Maximus, human will is characterized by self-determination. But this self-determination is not necessarily linked to the possibility of choosing between good and evil. Self-determination is a characteristic of will, not of choice (9) . This, therefore, implies that human will is not neces­sarily either evil or even subject to the possibility of choosing evil. Maximus opposes the view put forward by Polemon, ac­cording to which human will, even at the stage of deification, cannot overcome the mutability which might lead it to sin (10). According to Maximus, human nature and its will are not evil, because they have been created by God.

In stressing this, Maximus claims that the cause of man's fall as a result of evil, is not God, but the use of man's free will without filtering criteria. When man voluntarily moves mind­lessly and against his true nature and thus away from God, he runs the danger of returning to nothing. As we have already seen, this situation appears with various ramifications, with fluctuations, with ambivalence and with a dramatic and mani­fold, so to speak, distortive alteration.

III.Towards an Ontology of Evil?

We may note that for orthodox Christian theology, evil, by default, fundamentally lacks ontological substance, firstly for the simple reason that it would create a dualism of authorities, with extreme implications of various dimensions including both depth and width, such as those associated with redemp­tion. It was a question that in the fourth century had been ad­dressed by Athanasius when he asserted the inherent goodness of creation and denied of evil any positive or substantial status. The recurrence of strongly dualistic heresies throughout the Pa­tristic period and beyond, necessitated the frequent recourse to this basic orthodox affirmation (11) . Evil is not, therefore, a reality that is a counterpart to good, in a dualistic framework restric­tive of divine power, i.e. an ontological and ethical system that would be comprised of dialectically opposed forces. It, thus, cannot be established as an authority, nor can it precede or suc­ceed the time of its manifestation.

Similarly, Plotinus and Proclus had already denied not only moral, but also physical dualism in the sense that there is no absolute or unmixed evil, as everything proceeds from the pri­mary Good (12) . In any case, it expresses a denial of the good, an arbitrary choice of the person, which, however ensures, despite its sinful effects, human independence (13) . And such a condition creates an interesting relationship because it ensures man's abil­ity to give meaning to his/her existence, with the conviction of an objective self realization, whatever the basis for that esti­mate.

In addition, Dionysius the Areopagite, in expressing these same views, will argue that evil has no substance (non-being), if perceived in the case of pure evil defined as to itself. Likewise, it self-referentially lacks the requirements of invading a region ontologically its superior, excluding of course the superlative which is purely God's domain. It is parypostasis ( παρυπόστα σις ), i.e. parasitic, and its range cannot exceed its self-semantics, a horizon of actions and self-realizations, under the restrictions we have already set (14) . It is precisely the fact that evil has no co­founding joint source and as a structure, its place is at the level of utter deprivation. It absolutely lacks authentic being ( είναι ) and is manifested by chance. There is no primary - essential quality as a mandate for keeping its being ( είναι ), but a mere accident, which, however tends to take radical tendencies, if the person committed to its «charm», increases the limits of his/her dialectical meeting with the elements that make up a pathogen­ic condition.

It is, therefore, obvious that the above considerations consti­tute the basis for Maximus' assurance, which echoes the entire Christian tradition, that evil does not exist as an entity - being, nor is a creation of God, but merely a deprivation of good (15) , a weakness, disease, failure and fall from the good. This negative situation occurs across the entire spectrum of created beings and constitutes a universal ontological law. Maximus concludes that : «Ώστε, a νυπόστατον το κακόν, επειδή μη μετέχει τον Θεού κατά στέρησιν έξεως φαινόμενο (16) ». («Thus, evil is non­substance, because it does not partake of God, it is a deprived phenomenon of habit»). Furthermore, evil does not exist, not because it is an ontological inferior entity - as according to Plo­tinus, who identifies evil with matter (17) - but because it is not something that God wills. In the final analysis, evil is non­existent because it is something that opposes God's will and God's love - and therefore something unknown to God (18) .

At this point Maximus expresses himself in a way that close­ly approaches the views of Dionysius the Areopagite. He writes in the prologue of Questions to Thalassius: 'Evil has not had, has not now, and will never have a proper existence of its own' (19) . Therefore, evil does not even exist rudimentary in terms of ac­tually being, since every product - regardless of how they mani­fest - of viewing the divine energies, by definition brought about the effects of good. There is not in the slightest, within God's creative design and execution, anything not only substan­tially, but even superficially evil, not even the Devil who fell from his initial status of natural goodness. The term actually as­signed to Diablo does not characterize him ontologically, but is based on his actions-deeds. He slanders, but cannot fundamen­tally demolish, undermines but cannot vanquish. It, therefore, concerns a choice, with consequences affecting only the one who performs the action.

Moreover, according to the superlative Christian tradition, the Devil is a fallen angel of a personal initiative. It is important to note, however, that his actions lack ontological inducement and, therefore, cannot significantly affect man's natural path to eschatological fullness-completion nor of creation in general. He has the flexibility, however, to interferingly delay it, with the inviolable fact that the condition for the realization of the fi­nal redemption is the very human participation, which will se­lect the ways to neutralize the delaying tactics of the fallen an­gelic forces. In this respect, evil, therefore originates, not from the nature of Devil itself, but from his own free choice to revolt against God and separate himself from Him (20) . As Thunberg remarks, the cause of sin may be the Devil, but always in close cooperation with the free will of man - sometimes to the degree that Maximus does not even mention the Devil (21) .

Let us explore this issue a little further. In the following Greek text, which is worth quoting at some length, is a compre­hensive summary with immediacy - both analytically and overall - of Maximus's positions concerning what evil is not, using traditional categories deriving mainly from the Platonic dialogue Parmenides:

Το κακόν ούτε ην, ούτε έσται κατ'οικείαν φύσιν υφεστώς· ούτε γάρ έχει καθ'οτιούν ουσίαν, ή φύσιν, ή υπόσταση’, ή δύναμιν, ή ενέργειαν εν τοις ούσιν- ούτε ποιότης έστιν, ούτε ποσότης, ούτε σχέσις, ούτε τόπος, ούτε χρόνος, ούτε θέσις, ούτε ποίησις, ούτε κίνησις, ούτε έξις, ούτε πάθος, φνσικώς τινι των όντων ενθεωρούμενον, ούτε μην εν τούτοις πάσιν το παράπαν κατ'οικείωσιν φυσικήν υφέστηκεν· ούτε αρχή, ούτε μεσό­της, ούτε τέλος έστι (22) .

(Evil neither was, nor will be existing of its own nature; nor therefore has in any way essence, nor nature, nor sub­stance, nor power, nor energy in beings; neither is it quali­ty, nor the quantity, nor relation, nor place, nor time, nor position, nor doing, nor motion, nor habit, nor passion, only within some beings perceived naturally, nor has nat­urally and entirely been within those natures familiar with it; nor is it beginning, nor intermission nor end).

The passage of Maximus quoted is clear: none of the catego­ries of being can be attributed to evil; and no naturalness is commensurate with its existence: neither does it exist ontologically nor is considered within beings as a primary - essential at­tributes. According to its own terms, therefore, evil is non­existent. Beginning as a misjudgment and constituting irration­al motion, it appears as a lack of that energy of beings that would ultimately lead them to the total end appertaining to their existence, to the Creator Himself. Therefore, evil does not have ontological structural articulation and is placed at the lev­el of utter deprivation and non-existence, both as radically op­posite to being and corrosive of the authentic being that partici­pates in it. It is, by default, devoid of authentic being ( είναι ) and is a coincidental epithet.

Evil do not consist of an inherent mandatory quality for ex­istence, but is exclusively an occurrence, which is attached with terms incompatible with whatever has been offered for divine deposits, both for human nature and for human persons. A cru­cial question, of course, remains: is nature or person the cause of evil? And, by extension, does the volition for its realization belong to both anthropological factors?

Let us consider for a minute, what happens with us, human persons. The "according to the image" cannot lead to the sinful­ness of nature (23) . In one of the most important of his ambiguous, Maximus argues that man was created in order to move to­wards God. However, because 'man moved voluntarily and mindlessly and against his nature ( παρά φυσιν )' away from God, 'he ran the danger of returning to nothing (24) . Elsewhere he indicates a psychological cause of the fall of man: the destruc­tive examination of his own lust (25) . It is his affection for himself - his self-love (26) , philautia ( φιλαυτία ) that is the root of evil. The originating vice of passion, as Maximus explains, is a deviant self-love thrusting humanity into a dialectical tug of war be­tween sensible pleasure and pain. According to this dialectic, man always seeks to find pleasure and avoid pain, an attempt in which he will never succeed, and which is in fact the direct cause of his despair (27) . The effects are disastrous: he is cut off from God, and divisions appear in human nature. But whatever their configuration in experience, these deviant passions, or vic­es, are metaphysical non-entities and exist only relative to hu­man free choice (28) .

Whether as misjudgment, thoughtless motion, or ignorance of the cause of beings, the parypostasis ( παρυπόστασι , ς ) of evil is a human matter and a unique direction of the processes of his/her mind (29) . Only the acts of fallen man allow evil to hori­zontally ascend to that state of becoming ( γίγνεσθαι ) of creat­ing nature, whereas in essence - as already mentioned - evil is unsubstantiated. Hence, the fall, through which human beings have manifested non-being within themselves (30) , is simultane­ously moral and ontological, but in that order, for it involves the irrational choice of non-being after being (31). From the basis of this interpretation comes to the fore a strong dialectical op­position between becoming ( γίγνεσθαι ) and being ( είναι ), be­tween the apparent ( φαίνεσθαι ) and that which really is ( όντως ον ), between ambivalence and stability and between revolutionary vagueness and the transcendental theoretical Word (Logos). By the following concise wording, Maximus cap­tures simple implications of the above: « Τα δε κατ ’ έλλειψιν πάλιν της αρετής δι ' ηδονήν σαρκός ενεργούμενα , εστερημένης τον καλόν υπάρχοντα προαιρέσεως , συναριθμηθήναι τοίς ούσιν ού δυνηθήσονται· το γαρ κακόν ανυπόστατον (32) ». (Those again that are acted through the pleas­ure of the flesh according to the lack of virtue, existing of voli­tion as the lack of good, cannot be counted with beings; there­fore evil is unsubstantiated).

It is quite remarkable to note here that Maximus commits himself to a principle of good or evil: use of things ( πράγματα ) that are intrinsically morally neutral, or more specifically the use of the thoughts ( νοήματα ) of those things (33) . In Ambiguum 7 Maximus contrasts 'right use' ( ευχρηστία ) with 'ill use' ( παρα - χρηστία ) of natural human faculties (34) . Thus, we can say, follow­ing Maximus's thought, that everything becomes a good or an evil for its possessor according to the use made of it.

Evil, however, owes its origin precisely to the specific direc­tion that the activation of volition acquires, when the soul is removed for a variety of reasons for the good. Evil as a special­ized act is, therefore, lack of virtue, as, similarly thinking, blindness comprises the deprivation of the physical energy of vision. Both the reasoning and narrative linguistic impression of the cited text, we could argue, record a depiction of relation­ships clearly influenced by Proclus. It should be noted that since the 5th century Proclus had systematically dealt with the ontological Precedings of morality, thus utilizing a long tradi­tion starting from Plotinus. Specifically, the neoplatonist phi­losopher seeks the cause of evil, by steadily maintaining in force the view that the gods, in that they are according to their very existence the causes of all good, are therefore excluded from being the source of any evil (35) . Here again, it should be mentioned that among the necessities of the nature of God, foremost is that which holds that He is good. As His goodness is a necessity joined with His essence, God lacks the ability to do evil, since this would be contrary to His nature which neces­sitates His goodness (36) .

These considerations make it more interesting to note that when the existence and essence of the supreme being are de­fined with the name of the good and when with his energetic wealth it itself produces everything, it necessarily provides good and not bad things in the substances coming from the productive expressions. In shared expertise, every subordinate god is good, in that the initial good is God. The Highest Princi­pality, therefore, or the One, through its forces of henads, is the cause of every good, which is provided to the lower levels of reality, in their entirety, which therefore from the beginning have a positive evaluation sign. Based on the order of consider­ations made, the issue henceforth takes on definite of exclusivi­ty, also of an initial character: the good is only beneficial as per­taining to its - repetitively emitted - offerings. It cannot be evil- doing, since evil is not inherent in substance nor in any other element of its existence (37) .

It is concluded from the aforementioned that evil does not have a basis than can be described with authentic ontological categories, save only with those of moral order accompanied by the false and not rationally controlled motion of people (38) . It ex­ists parasitically and, consequentially, the categories that can express it are negative and can comfortably be perceived as ex­pressive of the weakness of knowledge and the realization of good. Consequently, evil causes, as a result, the formation of new types of categories, indication of the man's strife on to the path to perfection. As for this failure, a treaty is here formed, which at first sight is paradoxical: while there is talk of the principle attribute, that of freedom, which is «utilized» by the personal and rational beings, the same at once promote a way of their spread that tarnishes that attribute and ultimately ren­ders it meaningless such that would have formed categories of an establishment quality. But here the overall conditions can be reversed and a return to the original wording of categories may occur, to the return to the position: Thus, even if human voli­tion as an essential factor of ethical attitude dissolved the divine-human dialectic, it is the only thing that in anthropological terms can redeem it and reacquire the primordial.

Having arrived at the conclusion of our study regarding the nature and character of the evil Maximus repeats, at regular in­tervals of reasoning, the generally accepted opinions of Chris­tian tradition. His only contribution, as G. Florovsky observes, which is original, is the persistent emphasis on volitional fac­tors, an indication by which we would classify him in the cate­gory of thinkers that make up a philosophy of the subject or a psychology of the inner self (39) . In his work, the human "self" is intensively placed in the center of interest. And, as Hans U. Von Balthasar has rightly put it, hypostasis responds to the question "who?" and indicates a "self" (40). For Maximus, a man is free to choose between two things, thus leading us back to the moral concept of freedom. But evil is not in fact an alternative choice with an ontological content since its 'content' is non - being. This obviously implies that the problem of evil is considered to be rooted in man's self - determining ill will. However, one's hypostatic state, either to 'ever-ill being' or 'ever-well being', is up to the personal use of that natural faculty and is not deter­mined by God, but is utterly free.

Summary

According to Maximus the Confessor, evil finds fertile ground in creation and is further promoted by the self­determining movement of personal beings. God is not related to evil causing conditions, since this, as a situation is non-being, has neither essence, nor substance, and therefore is ontological- ly outside the horizon of possibility. Thus, despite the undenia­ble fact that God is the person who grants free will as an ability and means for man, we need not discuss that each person is di­rected toward good or evil without his/her free deliberate choice. In any case, evil is an expression of the denial of the good, an arbitrary choice of the subject, which ensures howev­er, despite the consequences of the fall, human independence. Therefore, although man's deliberate choice, as an essential fac­tor of his moral attitude, broke the dialectic between the divine and the human, it is the only thing, from an anthropological perspective, that can restore and recover the primordial state.

Notes

(1)Maximus, Opusc. 15, PG 91, 157C. According to Maximus, God created man self­determining by nature.

(2)Maximus, Disputatio, PG 91, 324D.

(3)Maximus, Opusc. 1, PG 91, 20B. For more on this, see also De Anima, PG 91, 357D.

(4)Maximus, Disputatio, PG 91, 304C. M. Doucet has argued that the whole willing proce­dure is subject to man's power. Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, Introduction, text cri­tique, traduction et notes, unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Montreal, 1972, p. 184. For more on this issue, see also D. Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ, Person, Nature, And Will in the Christology of St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, pp. 124-125. It is noticeable that Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition depends evil on deliberate choice, see for in­stance Plato, Theaet., 176a; also Proclus, De mal. Sub., 37.5-7.

(5)Gregory of Nyssa, The Great Catech 5. For if necessity was the master of man's life, the im­age of God would have been falsified in that particular part.

(6)As well as by the individualization and fragmentation of being which are inherent in it. For further discussion, see J. Zizioulas, Communion & Otherness, Further Studies in Person- hood and the Church, ed. Paul McPartlan, London- New York, 2006, p. 232.

(7)See L. Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, The Vision of St Maximus the Confessor, St Vladi­mir's Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York, 1985, p. 57.

(8)Maximus, Disputatio, P.G.91, 2942D- 293B, where Maximus clearly points out that the actualization of will depends on the personal wilier.

(9)For more on this, see M. Doucet, Dispute de Maxime le Confesseur avec Pyrrhus, pp. 185- 186. As G.C. Berthold has expressed it 'what is certain, however, is that in Maximus, per­haps for the first time, we see this vague Aristotelian appetite recognized as a full-fledged human faculty, the will'. Freedom and Liberation in the Theology of Maximus the Confessor, un­published doctoral thesis, Catholic Institute of Paris, 1975, p. 153.

(10)Maximus, Opusc. 15, PG 91,169D-172A.

(11)Maximus, Amb.Io. 42, PG 91,1332A: 'The being of evil is marked by non-existence'. See further J. Pelican, The Christian Tradition, ii The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700), University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1974, pp. 216-226.

(12)Plotinus, Enn., I. 8.3.1-5; Proclus, De mal. Sub., X.30.6, 35.12, Theol. Plat., I 18; in Tim. 1 373 ff. See also C. Steel's thorough discussion in Proclus on the existence of evil, Procceedings of the Boston area colloquium in ancient philosophy, 14,1998, pp. 83-102.

(13) See , for instance , Chr . Terezis , Φιλοσοφική Ανθρωπολογία στο Βυζάντιο, Ελληνικά Γράμματα, Athens , 1997, pp . 50-51.

(14) Dionysius Areop ., De div . nom ., PG 3, 721 A , 732 C : «Διό ούτε ύπόστασιν εχει τό κακόν άΛλά παρυπόστασιν...». (Because neither substance has the evil but parypostasis). On this, see also Ch. Schafer, Undemalum, Die Frage nach deni woher des Bosen bei Plotin, Augustinus und Diony­sius, Konigshausen und Neumann, 2002. The same position is also found in the neo-Platonic phi­losopher Proclus, see Theologia Platonica, I, 83,2 - 87.21. C.f. Ant. Leoyd, «Parypostasis in Proclus», Proclus et son influence, Actes du Colloque de Neuchtael, 1985, pp. 145-157.

(15)See, for example, Basil the Great, Quod Deus non est auctor Malorum, PG 31, 34IB: « στέρησις αγαθού έστί τό κακόν » (Evil is deprivation of good). From the resulting context comes the opti­mistic example of both Christianity and Neoplatonists regarding the prospect for the evolution of the generated world.

(16)Maximus, Scholia eccl. Hier. 3.2, PG 4, 53A. It must not go unnoticed that the use of the term phenomenon' cannot be considered independently of the « είναι » with the ontological differences that exist between them. Each phenomenon is occasional.

(17)On this, see O' Meara, Plotinus, pp. 81-83. In p. 82 O Meara writes that 'by deprivation of the good' the Christian theologians mean, not an existing reality, but a willful turning away of the soul from God'.

(18)It is noteworthy that, for Proclus, intellective intellect does not know evil, because evil has no form. See L. Siorvanes, Proclus: Neo - Platonic Philosophy and Science, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1996, p. 157. For Maximus, however, God does not know evil, because evil is against his will. This is discussed at greater length in D. Bathrellos, Neo-platonism and Maximus the Confessor on the Knowledge of God, Studia Patristica, (will be published).

(19)See Maximus, Quaest. Thai, ed. C. Laga - C. Steel, Leuven University Press, Tumhout- Brepols, 1980,1-LV 29.

(20) See VI. Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, Crestwood, Saint Vladimir's Seminary Press, New York, 1978, pp. 132-133. 'It was the will of angels eternally resolved to be hostile to­wards God that first gave birth to evil. Evil is the attraction of the will towards non-being, the ne­gation of creation, and of God, and it is, particularly, a violent hatred of grace, to which the rebel­lious will is obdurately opposed'.

(21)See L. Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, p. 57.

(22)Maximus, Quaest. Thai, ed. C. Laga - C. Steel, Introduction 209-216 ( = «term evil», PG 90, 253 AB). See also B. Betsakou, Στάσις άεικίνητοβ (Restless motion), Η ανακαίνιση της Αριστο ­ τελικής κινήσεως στη θεολογία του αγίου Μαξίμου του Ομολογητού (The renovation of the Aristotelic movement in theology of Saint Maximus the Confessor), unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Thessalonica, 2004, pp. 211 - 221. More systematically on the sources of the quota­tion: We would not be unrealistic, in supporting that in that subparagraph the Christian catego­ries of Plato's dialogues Sophist and Parmenides and Aristotle's treatise Metaphysica are put to good use, namely in the pillars of western metaphysics. As commentator, Maximus, of the treatise of Dionysius the Areopagite Περί Θείων ονομάτων (De div. nom.) has, at least indirect contact with all of these categories. Note that the apophatic side of theology it is not used here, but it is about the refusals - opposing statements regarding the ontological value.

(23)This interpretation of Genesis 1.26-27 can be found in Origen, Princ., 3.6.1 (SC 268. 234-8), Clement, Str. 2.22 (SC 38.133), Evagrius, Mel., 12.484-5: 'That which is natural to man, is that man was created in the image of God; what is supernatural is that we come to be in his likeness' (trans. from the Syriac by Parmentier, Evagrius ofPontus 'Letter to Melania' I', p. 289).

(24)Maximus, Amb., PG 91,1308CD.

(25)Maximus, Liber Asceticus, PG 90,912A, trans. P. Sherwood.

(26)See Maximus, Carit., PG 90, 985C. See also I. Hausherr's detailed analysis of deviant self- love in Philautie: de la tendresse pour soi a la charite selon Maxime le Confesseur, Pont. Institutum Orri- entalium Studiorum, 1952, pp. 43-83. L.Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The theological Anthro­pology of Maximus the Confessor, 2d, Chicago, Open Court, 1995, pp. 232- 248.

(27) See L. Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos, p. 58.

(28)P.Blowers, 'Gentiles of the Soul: Maximus the Confessor on the Substructure and Trans­formation of the Human Passions', Journal of Early Christian Studies 4:1,1996, p. 71.

(29)Maximus, Quaest. Thai, ed. C. Laga-C. Steel, LI 183-187 (= PG 90,484C).

(30)Maximus, Amb.Io 20, PG 91, 1237BC. A . Bletsis , To προπατορικό αμάρτημα στη θεολογία Μαξίμου του Ομολογητού, Έρευνα στις απαρχές μιας οντολογίας των κτιστών, Τέρτιος, Thes - salonica , 1998, pp . 256-264.

(31)Maximus, Amb.Io 7, PG 91,1092C-1093A.

(32) Maximus, Comments on Ekklesiastis (in Catenis: Catenatrium patrum), ed. S. Luca, Corpus Christianorum, Series Greaca II. Tumhout: Brepols, 1983, I. 139. The use of the infinitive « συναριθμηθήναι » (be counted with) raises the crucial question of being classified together or not in the same class or the same genus, so should be examined on a second level as well as the possibilities of the applicability of the categories of similarity and dissimilarity. These categories clearly indicate a common origin, but are both declarative of the procedures of modality, which spreads with quantitative infinite ramifications, such as preventing the formation of a simplistic - static - rigid monism. They establish a variety of enharmony.

(33)Maximus, Carit., PG 90,1008AB; also ibid. 1008B-1009A.

(34)Maximus, Amb. 7, PG 91,1097C.

(35)For more on this, see Chr. Terezis, « Όψεις της έννοιας του κακού στον Πρόκλο και τον Δ . Αεροπαγίτη » (Versions of the meaning of the evil in Proclus and D. Aeropagite), Σύναξη , vol. 62, April-June 1997, p. 27. See also J. Opsomer- C. Steel, Proclus, On the Existence of Evils, The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle, Cornell University Press, 2003.

(36)Philoponus, Cat., 171.1-4, Proclus, Ale., 107.19-24. Cf. Plato, Tim., 25e.

(37)Proclus, Plat.Theol., 118, p. 82, pp. 83,1-11. C.f. and Andr. Manos, Proclus the Platonic Succes­sor, The science of beings initiator to the view of the one, ed. « Gregory », Athens , 2006, p . 77.

(38) Maximus , Car ., PG 90,1052 A . In our present context he writes : «Ου περί την ουσίαν των γεγονότων το κακόν θεωρείται, άλλα περί την εσφαλμένην και αλόγιστον κίνησιν». (Nei­ther in the essence of events is evil perceived, but in false and irrational movement).

(39)G. Florovsky ,The Byzantine Fathers of the Sixth to Eighth Century, Vaduz, Bucherver- triebsanstalt, 1987, pp. 374-375.

(40)Hans Urs von Balthasar, Liturgie cosmique : Maxime le Confesseur, trans. L.Lhaumet and H.- A. Preutout, Paris, Aubier, 1947, p. 164.